TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Güth, Werner
A1  - Nithammer, Juri
A1  - Orland, Andreas
T1  - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty
T2  - Conflict resolution
N2  - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.
KW  - stochastic uncertainty
KW  - strategic uncertainty
KW  - cooperation
KW  - Ultimatum
KW  - Game
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2022
UR  - https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/62604
SN  - 0022-0027
SN  - 1552-8766
VL  - 66
IS  - 4-5
SP  - 755
EP  - 782
PB  - Sage Publ.
CY  - Thousand Oaks
ER  -