Property rights and resource allocation in an overlapping generations model

  • The paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.

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Metadaten
Author:Hans-Peter Weikard
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-8543
Series (Serial Number):Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge / Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, ISSN 1864-1431 (Bd. 17)
Document Type:Book
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2006/09/12
Year of Completion:1997
Publishing Institution:Universität Potsdam
Release Date:2006/09/12
Source:Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; 17 / Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Potsdam
RVK - Regensburg Classification:QL 000
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft